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In Delaware, as in the majority of other states, the landlord-
tenant law has undergone relatively little change until recently.
The evolution of tenant rights and remedies has been slow and im-
mutably bound to a common law which regarded the real property
lease as a legal hybrid: in some respects a conveyance of a non-
freehold estate, in others a contract.' The conveyance aspect, how-
ever, has dominated.
American landlord-tenant law has developed from English
common law where the lease was viewed as a conveyance of an
estate by the lessor to the lessee.2 In return for the non-freehold
estate in the land for a term the lessee covenanted to pay rent.8
Other covenants were considered independent of the basic lease ob-
ligation.4 In agrarian, rural England the land was central to the
concept of a leasehold and the rent was viewed as issuing from
the land.5 The concept of "rent for possession" worked well in the
socio-economic setting of 16th century England.6 Caveat emptor
was the rule of the day3 The lessee, however, had equal oppor-
tunity to inspect the land and the doctrine of caveat emptor did
not, therefore, work so harsh a result. Theoretically, the yeoman
farmer tenant was as well equipped as the landlord to repair the
few simple defects which could arise. Whereas the property law
1. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.1 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [here-
inafter cited as AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY]. For an excellent discussion
of the historical development of the real property lease, see MOYNIHAN, IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 63-73 (1962); Hicks, The Contrac-
tual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1972).
2. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.42.
3. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, Ti HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 131
(2d ed. 1923).
4. See note 77 and accompanying text infra.
5. "[T]he governing idea is that the land is bound to pay for the rent.
.2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 3.
6. Originally (1200-1500) the rights of the lessee were contractual in
nature, but with the development of the action of ejectment in 1499, the
lessee acquired property rights in the lease and a remedy to protect his
possessory interest as owner of an estate in the land. See Lesar, The Land-
lord Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back
in 900 years?, 9 KAN. L. REv. 369 (1961).
7. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text infra.
concepts of the lease served well the needs of an agrarian society,
when these same concepts are applied to a predominantly urban,
commercial-industrial society where the real property lease is pri-
marily a means of providing shelter and services for the lessee, real
problems and unjust results arise."
The desirability of fundamental changes in landlord-tenant law
has been dealt with extensively and adequately by other commenta-
tors.9 Recent judicial decisions and legislation in other jurisdictions
have significantly altered the obligations, remedies and other sub-
stantive aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship. 10 In 1972 the
Delaware General Assembly enacted a new Landlord-Tenant Code."'
The new Code is comprehensive and effects basic changes in both
the Delaware common and statutory law. All aspects of the land-
lord-tenant relationship including rental agreement formation, ten-
ant obligations, landlord obligations, remedies, and procedural mat-
ters have been dealt with by the Code. The purpose of this Com-
ment, however, is to consider only the various changes the Code
has instituted in Delaware law with regard to tenants' rights and




At common law in Delaware a lessor had very few obligations
and owed few duties to a tenant absent express covenants whereby
a landlord would voluntarily assume such duties. As will be devel-
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Introduction at 4 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1973). See also Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Ten-
ant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969).
9. See, e.g., A.B.A. Committee on Leases, Trends in Landlord-Tenant
Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL. PROP. & TRUST J. 550 (1971); Lesar,
Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279 (1960); Quinn & Phil-
lips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with
Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. Rsv. 225 (1969); Schoshinski,
Remedies of the Indigent Tenant-Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519
(1966). Further indication of the recent concern for reform in landlord-
tenant law is evidenced by the recent drafting of the MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent. Draft 1969) and the UNIFORm 'RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT (1972).
10. See, e.g., Special Project-Developments in Contemporary Land-
lord-Tenant Law: An Annotated Bibliography, 26 VAND. L. REV. 689
(1973).
11. DEL. CODE AN I. tit. 25, §§ 5101-6504 (Supp. 1972). The governor
signed the bill June 29, 1972 and, 90 days after the governor's approval the
act became effective. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5101 (Supp. 1972): This
law shall be known and may be cited as the "Landlord-Tenant Code" or
"Code."
12. The Code includes a chapter reserving separate rules and discus-
sion for mobile home owners. See DEn. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 7001-7014
(Supp. 1972). Discussion of mobile homeowners, landlord remedies, tenant
obligations, rental agreement formation, etc., is outside the scope of this




oped later, even the protection offered by these express covenants
often proved illusory in the tenant's efforts to achieve a habitable
dwelling. This section will examine the extent to which the obliga-
tions imposed by the new Code alters the landlord's pre-Code re-
sponsibilities to the tenant.
A. Habitability
Prior to the adoption of the new Landlord-Tenant Code, the
doctrine of caveat emptor prevailed with regard to the leasing of
real property.'8 In Delaware's leading case, Leech v. Husbands,
14
the tenant of an unfurnished apartment refused to pay rent and
eventually was forced to move out prior to expiration of the lease
because the apartment was so infested with vermin, bugs, and di-
sease germs as to endanger the health of the occupants and render
the premises unfit for human habitation. The Delaware Superior
Court said that absent an express covenant, the landlord had no
obligation to supply a habitable dwelling. 15 As to an unfurnished
apartment then, there was no implied covenant, or even a warranty
that it is either reasonably fit or safe for habitation, at the com-
mencement of the term.' This same rule was also applied to the
lease of a building for commercial purposes. 7
Closely linked with an obligation of the lessor to provide a hab-
itable dwelling at the start of the term, is a duty to repair. In
Delaware where the landlord had no initial duty to provide a habit-
able dwelling, he logically had no implied duty to repair and
thereby maintain, for the duration of the term, tenantable prem-
ises."8 Where there was no obligation to repair imposed on the
landlord in the lease, he was under no duty to make them.'9 Where
the landlord could be held liable for injuries arising from latent
defects of which he had knowledge,20 disclosure rather than repairs
was exacted from him.
That the tenant and landlord were free to contract and to alter
13. See, e.g., Richard Paul Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp.
252 (D. Del. 1945); Leech v. Husbands, 34 Del. 362, 152 A. 729 (Super. 1930).
14. 34 Del. 362, 152 A. 729 (Super. 1930).
15. Id. at 366, 152 A. at 731.
16. Id.
17. Richard Paul Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Del. 1945).
18. See, e.g., Richard Paul Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp.
252 (D. Del. 1945); Grochowski v. Stewart, 53 Del. 330, 169 A.2d 14 (1961);
James v. Boines, 294 A.2d 94 (Del. 1972); Old Time Petroleum v. Turcol,
18 Del. Ch. 121, 156 A. 501 (1931).
19. Id.
20. See notes 52, 53 and accompanying text infra.
these common law obligations by express covenants in the lease
was of little moment, practically speaking. The shortage of low
cost housing and the fact that leases, being either long standard
form agreements provided by the landlord or oral bargains, left the
tenant in a poor bargaining position.2 1 He was, therefore, generally
unable to economically coerce the landlord to warrant the fitness
of the premises or to covenant to keep them in repair.
The new Code rejects these two traditional rules and imposes
an affirmative obligation on the landlord to supply and maintain
a "fit" rental unit.2 2 Section 5303 of the Code states that the land-
lord must comply with all applicable provisions of state, or local,
statutes and ordinances governing the "maintenance, construction,
use, or appearance of the rental unit and the property of which
it is a part. '2  In addition to this broad standard, specific duties
are enumerated. The landlord is duty bound to maintain in good
working order plumbing, electrical appliances, and other facilities
provided by him, and he must provide "reasonable amounts" of heat
and hot water.2 4 Implicit in these provisions to effectively insure
continuously habitable premises is a duty of repair. Nevertheless,
section 5303 creates an express duty in the landlord to make all
repairs necessary to keep the premises in the condition they ought
to have been at the commencement of the tenancy.
25
By placing upon the landlord an obligation to supply and main-
tain a habitable dwelling, the legislature has recognized and codi-
fied a nationwide judicial trend to imply a warranty of habitability
21. See Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real
Property, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 275 n.2 (1966); Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism
as a Tort, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 869, 893-99 (1967); 56 GEo. L.J. 920 (1968).
22. Da. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
a. The landlord shall at all times during the tenancy:
(1) Comply with all applicable provisions of any state or local
statute, code, regulation or ordinance governing the main-
tenance, construction, use, or appearance of the rental unit
and the property of which it is a part;
(2) Provide a rental unit which shall not endanger the health,
welfare or safety of the tenants or occupants and is fit for
the purpose for which it is expressly rented;
(3) Keep in a clean and sanitary condition all areas of his
building, grounds, facilities, and appurtenances which are
maintained by the landlord;
(4) Make all repairs and arrangements necessary to put and
keep the rental unit and the appurtenances thereto in as
good a condition as they were, or ought by law or agree-
ment to have been, at the commencement of the tenancy;
(5) Maintain all electrical, plumbing, and other facilities sup-
plied by him in good working order;
(6) If the rental agreement so specifies, provide and maintain
appropriate receptacles and conveniences for the removal
of ashes, rubbish, and garbage, and arrange for the frequent
removal of such waste; and
(7) If the rental agreement so specifies, supply water, hot wa-
ter and adequate heat as reasonably required by the tenant.
23. Id. § 5303(a) (1).
24. Id. § 5303(a) (5), (7).
25. Id. § 5303(a) (4).
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in a lease for a dwelling.26 In Delaware legislative bodies have
recognized a valid governmental and public interest in the mainte-
nance of decent housing as evidenced by county or municipal hous-
ing and building codes. Furthermore, the stated policy of the Land-
lord-Tenant Code is to maintain and improve the quality of housing
in Delaware.27 Fixing the landlord with an obligation to maintain
a fit rental unit recognizes both the tenant's legitimate expecta-
tions, and the public's interest in the maintenance of quality hous-
ing.2s
Section 5303, then, sets up general standards of habitability
to which the landlord is bound to conform. Incorporated by refer-
26. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d
62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Bonner v. Beechem, CCH Pov. L. REP. 11,098
(Colo. County Ct. 1970); Lemle v. Breedon, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470
(1969); Jack Spring Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemmingway, Mass. , 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H.
87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
In a leading case, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a warranty of habitability measured by standards set forth in the
District of Columbia Housing Code Regulations is implied by operation of
the law into leases of urban dwelling units covered by the regulations. The
opinion noted that when public policy has been enacted into law like the
housing code, that policy will usually have deep roots in the expectations
and intentions of most people and that by signing the lease the landlord
has taken a continuing obligation to the tenant to maintain the premises
in accordance with all applicable law. Id.
27. 58 DEL. LAws ch. 472, § 5102 (1972) sets forth the purposes and
policies of the Code which provides:
This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies. The underlying purposes and
policies of this Act are:
(1) To simplify and clarify the law governing landlord and
tenant relationships;
(2) to encourage landlords and tenants to maintain and im-
prove the quality of housing in this State; and
(3) to revise and modernize the law of landlord and tenant
to serve more realistically the needs of modern day soci-
ety.
The revisors of the DEL. CODE ANN. pursuant to authority vested in them
in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 211 (Supp. 1972) have omitted the declaration
of policy from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5101-6504 (Supp. 1972) (originally
enacted as 58 DEL. LAws ch. 472).
28. When American city dwellers both rich and poor seek 'shel-
ter' today, they seek a well known package of goods and services-
a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings but also
adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities,
secure windows and doors, proper sanitation and maintenance.
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
srry, Introductory note at 167 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
ence into this provision are standards dictated in various county
and municipal housing and buiding codes.2 9 These various hous-
ing code requirements are, often detailed and specific, and the
task of measuring compliance is relatively simple. However, absent
local building and housing codes, determination of compliance be-
comes more complex. 0 Where such codes fail to exist, the landlord
has an overall obligation to provide a rental unit which shall not
endanger the health, welfare, or safety of its occupants, and which
is fit for the purpose for which it is rented." This latter standard
by the very generality and vagueness of its terms, "health, welfare
and safety" suggests a less rigorous standard than that provided
in the more detailed housing codes.
Section 5309 provides that evidence of compliance with an ap-
plicable housing code is prima facie evidence that the landlord has
complied with his obligation.32 But where there is something less
than strict compliance with the housing codes or where there are
no applicable housing codes, judicial interpretation will be required
to further delineate this latter standard.-- it is clear, ilowever, that
minor discrepancies with the applicable codes are de minimus. Be-
fore the landlord breaches his obligation to supply and maintain
a fit rental unit, there must be a substantial failure to conform
to the rental agreement or material non-compliance with pertinent
codes or statutes.
3 4
29. NEW CASTLE CouNTY, DEL., CODE §§ 10-1 to 10-120 (1972); WIL-
lINGTON, DEL., CODE §§ 34-1 to 34-82 (1969).
30. Presently New Castle County has a housing and building code as
does Wilmington and several of the incorporated towns in the county. Kent
and Sussex Counties do not, however, have county housing codes although
some towns within these counties do. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4021 (Supp.
XII, 1970) has formally recommended adoption of a statewide housing code.
As of this writing such a code has not been promulgated.
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303(a) (2) (Supp. 1972).
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5309 provides:
Evidence of compliance with an applicable housing code shall be
prima facie evidence that the landlord has complied with the pro-
visions of this chapter or any other chapter of Title 25.
33. To discern legislative intent one would naturally turn first to the
committee reports and written records of hearings preceding passage of 58
DEL. LAWS ch. 472 (1972) (The Landlord-Tenant Code). Such records did
not, however, accompany passage of this act. Few hearings were held, and
they have been recorded on tape only. 58 DEL. LAWS ch. 472, § 5101 (1972)
offers some guidelines. See note 27 supra. In that the Code bears much
similarity to the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent. Draft
1969) reference to the comments accompanying the MODEL CODE, supra,
would be useful.
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5304 (Supp. 1972). In considering what
was an actionable breach of an implied warranty of habitability the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii in Lemle v. Breedon, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470
(1969), said both the seriousness of the claimed defect and the length of
time for which it persists are relevant factors. The New Jersey District
Court in considering what nonfeasance of the landlord was substantial
enough to be considered a breach of an implied warranty of habitability
specifically exempted "amenities," e.g., malfunction of venetian blinds, wa-
ter leaks, wall cracks, lack of painting. Academy Squires Inc. v. Brown,




Once a tenancy has commenced, there has been general agree-
ment at common law that neither the landlord, anyone acting under
him, nor a holder of better title may withhold possession from the
lessee.3 This is known as a covenant of quiet enjoyment. Nor-
mally this covenant is explicit in a lease, but absent such a provision
it generally will be implied by the courts.3 6 Clearly, if the landlord
is prevented from delivering title due to the presence of someone
rightfully claiming under him, the covenant of quiet enjoyment
would be breached. 7 However, where a prior tenant wrongfully
holds over or a trespasser denies the tenant entry and possession,
American jurisdictions are sharply split as to the landlord's obliga-
tion to deliver possession.
38
The majority of jurisdictions presently favor the English
Rule.3 9 Under this rule, absent express provisions to the contrary,
there is an implied covenant on the part of the lessor that when
the time comes for the lessee to take possession, the premises shall
be open to his entry without impediment. 40 Failure to deliver such
possession breaches the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 41 The ration-
ale for the rule is that the tenant does not expect to purchase a
law suit.
42
However, a minority of courts follow the so-called American
Rule under which the landlord is not bound to deliver actual posses-
sion.43 The landlord is bound only to put the tenant in legal posses-
sion, so that no obstacle in the form of a superior right of posses-
35. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at § 3.37. See
Schwartzman v. Wilmington Stores Co., 32 Del. 7, 117 A. 739 (Super. 1922).
36. Standard Livestock Co. v. Pentz, 204 Cal. 618, 269 P. 645 (1928);
Lundry v. Wooden, 178 Kan. 179, 284 P.2d 586 (1955); Burofsky v. Turner,
274 Mass. 574, 175 N.E. 90 (1931); L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348,
233 S.W.2d 286 (1950).
37. See Schwartzman v. Wilmington Stores Co., 32 Del. 7, 117 A. 739
(Super. 1922).
38. See Comment, The Rights of a Reversionary Lessee Excluded From
Possession by a Holdover Tenant: The Pennsylvania Position, 75 DICK. L.
REv. 144 (1971); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 151 (1931).
39. E.g., King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880); Cohn v. Norton, 57
Conn. 480, 18 A. 595 (1889); Herpolshiemer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 107
N.W. 382 (1906); Adrian v. Rabinowitz, 116 N.J.L. 586, 186 A. 29 (1936);
Sloan v. Hart, 150 N.C. 269, 63 S.E. 1037 (1909); Whitefield v. Gay, 253 S.W.
2d 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). Delaware has not addressed this precise issue.
40. King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229, 232 (1880).
41. Id.
42. Coe v. Clay, 5 Bing. 440, 130 Eng. Rep. 1131 (C.P. 1829).
43. E.g., Playter v. Cunningham, 21 Cal. 229 (1862); Rice v. Biltmore,
141 Md. 507, 119 A. 364 (1922); Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 144 N.E.
69 (1924); Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
sion will intervene to prevent the tenant from obtaining actual pos-
session of the demised premises. 44 The theory offered to support
this rule is that the covenant of quiet enjoyment does not make
the landlord liable for independent acts of a third person unless he
has expressly so contracted.4 5  The tenant's remedy, then, under
this rule is against the trespasser or holdover tenant and not the
landlord as was the case under the English Rule.
The new Landlord-Tenant Code adopts essentially the English
Rule. Section 5301 of the Code requires that the landlord must
supply the rental unit bargained for and put the tenant into "full"
possession. 46 "Full" possession clearly describes something more
than legal possession. That the landlord is required to "put" the
tenant in possession demonstrates that it is primarily his obligation
and not the tenant's to insure that there are no obstacles to pre-
vent the latter's entry. In expressly placing such an affirmative
duty upon the landlord, the courts no longer need resort to finding
by implication a covenant warranting delivery of possession in a
lease; the duty arises out of the landlord-tenant relationship. Sec-
tion 5302 provides the tenant a remedy if the tenant's inability to
enter is cause by the landlord's substantial failure to conform to
the existing housing or building codes.47 Considering Section 5301
in conjunction with Section 5302, it is clear that the landlord has
not placed the tenant in "full" possession of the rental unit if the
rental unit substantially fails to conform to existing building and
housing codes. 48 The new Code, in effect, goes beyond the English
Rule. Full possession requires not only actual possession, but also
entry into a rental unit complying with applicable housing stand-
ards. Consequently substantial non-compliance with such codes
amounts to a constructive denial of possession.
C. Liability for Defective Premises
Just as the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to the condition
of the premises at the commencement of tenancy,4 it likewise was
applicable with respect to conditions of the premises during ten-
44. Cases cited note 43 supra.
45. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 363, 153 S.E. 824, 828 (1930).
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5301 (Supp. 1972) provides: "The land-
lord shall supply the rental unit bargained for at the beginning of the term
and put the tenant into full possession."
47. Id. § 5302 provides in part:
If the landlord fails to put the tenant into full possession of the
rental unit at the beginning of the agreed term, the rent shall abate
during any period the tenant is unable to enter and:
(2) If such inability to enter is caused wrongfully by the
landlord ... for substantial failure to conform to existing building
and housing codes, the tenant may recover reasonable expenditures
necessary to secure adequate suitable housing for up to one month.
48. See notes 40, 47 supra.
49. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
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ancy. The general rule was that the landlord was not liable to
a tenant, to a member of the tenant's family, or to a guest of the
tenant for personal injury or property damage due to the defective
condition of the demised premises.50
This general rule was subject to various exceptions. The land-
lord of an apartment building who demised separate portions of
the building to separate tenants, expressly or impliedly reserving
to himself control of common areas, had a duty to exercise reason-
able care over such areas.5 1 As to the demised premises specifically,
the landlord was liable for latent defects which he knew or had
reason to know existed at the time the premises were let, provided
the tenant did not know or have reason to know such a condition
existed.52 The burden, however, was upon the tenant to allege and
prove absence of knowledge of the latent defect, which if not met
would relieve the landlord of responsibility.53 Liability was also
imposed upon the landlord if he voluntarily or at the tenant's re-
quest negligently made repairs on the leased premises resulting in
injury to the tenants.54 Naturally where the tenant had the bur-
den of maintaining and repairing the leased premises under a cove-
nant of repair, neither the tenant nor those claiming under him
could recover from the landlord for injuries occurring on the leased
premises.55 Manifestly, the tenant's ability or right to bring an
action against the landlord for damages to his person or his prop-
erty was severely limited. Subject to the foregoing exceptions, the
landlord had no duty and therefore incurred no liability for fail-
ure to repair defective premises.
The Code significantly alters the duties existing between the
landlord and the tenant with regard to the defective condition of
the premises and liability for injuries arising therefrom. Section
5303 of the Code fixes the obligation to repair and maintain the
demised premises squarely on the landlord.5 6 Apparently in recog-
nition of the fact that inequities in the bargaining position between
50. E.g., Young v. Saroukos, 55 Del. 149, 185 A.2d 274 (Super. 1962);
Grochowski v. Stewart, 53 Del. 330, 169 A.2d 14 (Super. 1961); Seligman
v. Simon, 46 Del. 301, 83 A.2d 682 (Super. 1951).
51. Young v. Saroukos, 55 Del. 149, 165, 185 A.2d 274, 282 (Super.
1962).
52. Brandt v. Yeager, 57 Del. 326, , 199 A.2d 768, 771 (Super. 1962);
Grochowski v. Stewart, 53 Del. 330, 333, 169 A.2d 14, 16 (Super. 1961).
53. Brandt v. Yeager, 57 Del. 326, , 199 A.2d 768, 771 (Super. 1962).
54. Id.; Fulmele v. Forrest, 27 Del. 155, 159, 86 A. 733, 734 (Super.
1913); Hysore v. Quigley, 14 Del. 348, 350, 32 A. 960, 962 (Super. 1892).
55. Grochowski v. Stewart, 53 Del. 330, 335, 169 A.2d 14, 17 (Super.
1961).
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303(d) (4) (Supp. 1972). See note 21
and accompanying text supra.
landlord and tenant often exist,5 7 Section 5515 of the Code provides
that every agreement either within or connected with the lease ex-
onerating the landlord from liability for injuries to persons or prop-
erty resulting from his acts or omissions in the operation and main-
tenance of the rental unit is unenforceable.5 8 Delaware courts have
in the past looked in disfavor upon clauses which exonerate a party
from the consequences of his own negligence or that of his agent. 59
The courts have very narrowly construed such clauses.6 0 Section
5515 codifies this policy, declaring the exculpatory clause unenforce-
able, thereby relieving the courts of the necessity to resort to
strained interpretations evident in Blum v. Kauffman6 ' to avoid
unconscionable results.
Although the landlord under the Code cannot disclaim liability
for the negligent performance of his obligation to maintain the
rental unit, he can by agreement shift his duty to repair. Section
5303 allows the landlord and tenant by independent agreement to
place the duty of repair upon the tenant with certain limitations.
62
The landlord absolutely cannot bargain away his duty to keep the
rental unit in compliance with the local housing or building codes.0 3
However, the tenant can, by separate agreement and for adequate
consideration apart from the rental agreement, assume the obliga-
57. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5515 provides:
Every agreement between landlord and tenant in or in connection
with a rental agreement exempting the landlord from liability for
damages for injuries to persons or property caused by or resulting
from the acts or omissions of the landlord, his agents, servants
or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the rental unit
or the property of which it is a part shall be unenforceable.
59. Blum v. Kauffman, 297 A.2d 48 (Del. 1972); Wilmington Housing
Authority v. Williamson, 228 A.2d 782 (Super. 1967); Pan American World
Airways v. United Aircraft Corp., 53 Del. 7, 163 A.2d 582 (Super. 1960).
60. In so construing such an exculpatory clause in Blum v. Kauffman,
297 A.2d 48 (Del. 1972), where the lease provided that the lessors would
not be liable for any damage, compensation or claim arising out of any rob-
bery or theft, the court ruled that this claim did not exonerate the lessors
of liability for lessee's loss as a result of a burglary. Id. at 49.
61. 297 A.2d 48 (Del. 1972). See note 60 supra.
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
*.(b) The landlord and tenant may agree by a conspicuous
writing independent of the rental agreement that the tenant is to
perform specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, or remod-
eling, but only if:
(1) The particular work to be performed by the tenant
is for the primary benefit of his rental unit, and will
be substantially consumed during the remaining ten-
ancy;
(2) The work is not necessary to bring a noncomplying
rental unit into compliance with a housing or building
code, ordinance or the like; and
(3) Adequate consideration apart from any provision of
of the rental agreement is exchanged for the tenant's
promise. In no event under this subsection may the
landlord treat performance of this agreement as a
condition to any provision of this rental agreement.
63. Id. § 5303(b) (2).
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tion to make repairs and improvements which he will substantially
consume during the tenancy.6 4 An agreement in compliance with
these latter provisons would not only relieve the landlord of his
duty to repair in such instances, but would also logically relieve
him of liability for injuries resulting from defective premises inci-
dent to the tenant's work. The Code's restrictive treatment of the
landlord's ability to disclaim or shift his repair obligation to the
tenant reflects judicial attitudes toward seller warranty disclaimers
in consumer transactions.6" The reluctance of the Code to permit
disclaimer of repair obligations and liability recognizes the impreg-
nable bargaining position usually occupied by the landlord,66 and
assumes that any responsibility placed on him which can be dis-
claimed, will be.67 Thus, the landlord's limited ability to bargain
away repair obligations would not effectively defeat the Code's in-
tent to place liability for breach of the obligation to repair on the
landlord.
Although the landlord is obligated to repair and cannot exoner-
ate himself from liability for his own negligence or that of his serv-
ants, Section 5506 of the Code recognizes an obligation in the tenant
to inform the landlord of defective conditions in the premises. 8
For this duty of notification to arise the defective condition of the
premises must be: (1) known to the tenant; (2) one which he be-
lieves is unknown to the landlord; (3) and one which he reasonably
believes is the duty of the landlord or other tenant to repair.69 If
these prerequisites are met and the tenant fails to inform the land-
lord, thereby breaching his duty, responsibility shifts to the tenant
for any liability or injury resulting to the landlord from the ten-
64. Id. § 5303(b) (1) (3).
65. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 (disclaimers); § 2-302 (uncon-
scionability). See generally 46 CORNELL L. REv. 607 (1961). In Hennigsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) the court found an
implied warranty of fitness for purpose in a contract for the sale of a car.
Noting that where judicial process has recognized a right to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries arising from breach of warranty, waiver of this
obligation signified a studied effort to frustrate that protection. Where
waiver of this warranty was secured through coercive use of disproportion-
ate bargaining power, the court ruled the disclaimer invalid.
66. See note 21 and accompanying text supra; MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-203, Comment (Tent. Draft 1969).
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (Cum. Supp. 1973) contains a provision simi-
lar to DEL. CODE ANN. § 5303 (Supp. 1972). See note 22 supra. However,
the landlord's obligation to repair may be waived by an agreement to the
contrary. Almost without fail leases recite such a waiver placing the tenant
in the same position he occupied at common law. Note, 21 HAsTInms L.J.
417-18 n. 1-6 (1969).
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5506 (Supp. 1972).
69. Id.
ant's failure to inform.70 Consequently the liability for keeping
dwelling units in good repair does not rest exclusively with the
landlord. Prior to enactment of the Code, the tenant was under
no such tort duty. The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code
71
in recognizing the same duty, notes that tenant cooperation is es-
sential to the detection and prompt correction of dangerous condi-
tions.7 2 Imposition of such an obligation is in apparent recognition
of the duty to warn or rescue implied from a special relationship
existing between the parties.7 3 Considering the mutual interest of
both the landlord and tenant in maintaining safe premises, the ten-
ant's duty to inform appears to be not only equitable but necessary
in accomplishing the Code's stated policy of improving the quality
of housing in Delaware.
7 4
II. REMEDIES
Although the Code provides several new obligations to be per-
formed by the landlord, not previously recognized in Delaware, the
practical utility of the Code will largely be measured by the degree
to which the remedies provided can effectively protect the tenant's
newly created rights. The legislature enacted several new remedies
and defenses designated to benefit the tenant in securing habitable
premises or protecting his possessory interests. In light of their
intended design, this section will examine the extent to which such
provisions modify the tenant's pre-Code remedies.
A. Lease-Contractual Nature
Whether to treat a lease as a conveyance or a contract has gen-
erated considerable confusion and inconsistency in the handling of
leases by the courts. The divergence of attitudes has been particu-
larly evident with respect to what remedies arise upon breach of
specific covenants in a lease. A lease has been defined as "a con-
tract by which one person divests himself of and another person
70. Id. provides in part: "The tenant shall be responsible for any lia-
bility or injury resulting to the landlord as a result of the tenant's failure
to report."
71. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-306, Comment
(Tent. Draft 1969).
72. Id.
73. There is a trend in tort law to recognize a duty in one to come
to the aid of another in danger when a special relationship exists between
the parties. E.g., Yu v. New York N.H. & H.R. Co., 145 Conn. 451, 144 A.2d
56 (1958) (carrier-passenger); Szabo v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 132 N.J.L. 331,
40 A.2d 562 (1945) (employer-employee); see W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF
TORTS § 56 (4th ed. 1971). The logical conclusion of such a trend ap-
proaches a general holding that the mere knowledge of serious peril, threat-
ening death or great bodily harm to another which an identified defendant
might avoid with little inconvenience, creates a sufficient relation recog-
nized by every moral and social standard, to impose a duty of action. W.
P OSSER, supra at 343.
74. See note 27 supra.
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takes possession of lands for a term whether long or short."75 The
tenant acquires a possessory estate and, naturally, possessory actions
designed to protect his possession.76 The typical lease, however,
has often included in addition several covenants on the part of the
landlord and tenant pertaining to heat, repairs, maintenance and
other essential elements. Yet, by regarding the lease as primarily
a conveyance of a possessory interest, these other covenants have
been considered as merely incidental. When they were breached
the traditional common law approach has been to interpret these
covenants as mutually independent.
77
If, however, the lease was viewed as primarily contractual in
nature, such that the rules pertaining to breach of contract actions
were applicable, a different result would be observed. In a bilateral
contract where the covenants are normally interpreted as mutally
dependent, a substantial breach of a material covenant excuses the
other party's performance. 8
The Code has clarified this inconsistent state of the law in Dela-
ware. Its approach towards the lease is fundamentally contractual
in nature. Material promises and obligations in the lease are inter-
preted as mutual and dependent conditions to the performance of
material obligations and promises of the other party.79 Thus, in
75. Lewes Sand Co. v. Graves, 40 Del. 189, 192, 8 A.2d 21, 24 (1939).
76. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.38; see notes 149,
160 and accompanying text infra.
77. See Susswein v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., C.C., 184 F. 102 (3d Cir.
1910); Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403, 117 A. 882 (1922); 1 H. TIFFANY, LAND-
LORD AND TENANT § 59 (1st ed. 1919); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (3d
ed. 1962).
Thus, applying the doctrine of independent covenants, the court in
Richard Paul Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945),
said that the plaintiff's covenant to pay rent is an independent covenant
and not dependent upon the defendants' covenant to repair. The breach
of the landlord's covenant to repair did not relieve the tenant of his obliga-
tion to pay rent; nor did it give the tenant a right to terminate the lease.
The tenant's only remedy was a suit for damages for breach of covenant.
Id. at 257.
78. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 267, 274 (1932). In Reeve v.
Hawke, 136 A.2d 196 (Del. Ch. 1957), the lessor covenanted not to lease
any of his other land to a competing business of the lessee. The court found
that this covenant was an integral part of the lease. The court, recognizing
the dependency of the covenants in the lease, noted that the lessee could
inter alia treat the violation of the covenant as putting an end to the con-
tract for purposes of its performance and sue for damages. Id. at 202.
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5112 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
(a) Material promises, agreements, covenants, or undertakings of
any kind to be performed by either party to a rental agree-
ment shall be interpreted as mutual and dependent conditions
to the performance of material promises, agreements, cove-
nants and undertakings by the other party.
addition to the usual remedy of damages, the landlord's breach of
covenants to repair, warranties of habitability, and other material
obligations or promises in the rental agreement justify the tenant's
termination of the rental agreement and present a valid defense
to any action for rent.80
Section 5112 does not make clear, however, whether the land-
lord's breach of a material promise in the rental agreement author-
izes, in addition, rent-withholding or rental abatement8 l while the
tenant continues in possession. Generally, rent-withholding is
tightly controlled and authorized only by statute.82 Often official
authorization and payment of rent into escrow are conditions prec-
edent to lawful rent-withholding 'by the tenant.8 3 Nevertheless,
rent-abatement to the fair market value of the premises has been
recognized by a recent trend in judicial decisions where the land-
lord has breached an implied warranty of habitability in the lease.8 4
On the basis of this interpretation of dependent covenants, and the
express intent of Section 5112 to interpret material covenants in
the lease as mutually dependent, it is fair to infer that Section 5i12
authorizes rent-abatement when the landlord breaches a material
80. Several other jurisdictions have interpreted the lease as a contract,
interpreting the covenants as mutually dependent, the breach of which gives
rise to the usual breach of contract remedies. E.g., Lemle v. Breedon, 51
Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.
2d 409 (1961). In Lemle the court found an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity and held that an infestation of rats was a material breach of the implied
warranty, allowing the tenants the right to rescind the contract and recover
their prepaid rent. In Pines the defendant tenants having abandoned the
premises successfully defended against an action for rent by the landlord.
The landlord's material breach of the implied covenant justified the tenant's
termination of the lease and the tenant was only liable for the reasonable
rental value of the premises during the time he remained in actual occu-
pancy.
81. Rent abatement and rent withholding are not generally regarded
as synonomous. Rent abatement relieves the tenant of all obligation to pay
rent for the duration of the breach. Rent withholding allows the tenant
to retain the rent or pay it into escrow until the landlord remedies the
breach. Special Project-Developments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant
Law: An Annotated Bibliography, 26 VAND. L. Rzv. 689, 740 (1973).
82. See, e.g., Rent Withholding: N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302A (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1972-73); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1972-73);
WILMINGTON, DEL. CODE § 34-34 (1969). Rent Abatement: LA. Crv. CODE
ANN. art. 2700 (1952); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07(4) (Spec. Pamphlet 1972).
83. Cases cited note 82, supra.
84. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Academy Squires Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970);
Jack Spring Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). Such a
breach was held to be a valid defense to the landlord's action for possession.
In Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the
court, in applying contract law to the lease, recognized the dependency of
covenants and decided that the rental covenant was dependent on the land-
lord's covenants. Similarly, in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351,
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972), the Illinois court permitted the defense of breaches of
covenants of habitability and repair to a forcible detainer action for posses-




covenant in the rental agreement. 5
In addition to rejecting the conveyance concept of the lease in
favor of a contractual interpretation as to the dependency of cove-
nants, the Code likewise adopts a contractual approach when the
tenant abandons the premises. The tenant is said to abandon the
premises when he relinquishes possession of the premises and no
longer continues to pay rent.86 If the landlord accepts the tenant's
offer to surrender the duration of his estate upon his abandonment,
then both the estate and rental agreement are terminated and the
tenant is not liable for rent after that time.8 7 If, however, the les-
sor refuses to accept the tenant's surrender of the premises, the ten-
ant is obligated to pay rent for the remainder of the term.88 Inter-
preting the lease as a conveyance the tenant remains liable for the
rent as it falls due whether he is in actual possession or not, so
long as the landlord does not interfere with the tenant's right to
possession and does not breach his covenant of quiet enjoyment by
evicting the tenant.
Delaware courts have not decided the precise issue as to
whether the landlord has a duty to mitigate the tenant's damages
by obligating the landlord to exercise due diligence to re-rent the
premises.8 9 Several jurisdictions rejecting the conveyance ap-
proach in favor of a contractual interpretation of the lease have
held the landlord under a duty to mitigate the tenant's damages
by making reasonable efforts to re-rent.9 The policy behind the
principle of avoidable consequences in the law of contract damages
is to discourage injured persons from passively suffering monetary
loss which could be averted by reasonable diligence and thereby con-
serve the economic welfare of the entire community by the maxi-
mum utilization of available resources.9 1
85. At least one other commentator reached a similar conclusion in-
terpreting an identical provision in the MODEL CODE, supra, note 9. See Gib-
bons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern Problems
with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASnNGs L.J. 369, 387 n.100
(1970).
86. Conner v. Jordin, 37 Del. 203, 181 A. 229 (Super. 1935).
87. Fell v. Dantzel, 16 Del. 137, 42 A. 439 (Super. 1895).
88. Chavin v. H.H. Rosin & Co., 246 A.2d 921, appeal after remand,
257 A.2d 228 (Del. 1968); Conner v. Jordin, 37 Del. 203, 181 A. 229 (Super.
1935); Lefland v. Emory, 2 Del. 227 (Super. 1837).
89. Cf. Chavin v. H.H. Rosin Inc. & Co., 246 A.2d 921, appeal after
remand, 257 A.2d 228 (Del. 1968); Curran v. Smith-Zollinger Co., 18 Del.
Ch. 220, 157 A. 432 (1931).
90. E.g., Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968); Weinstein
v. Griffin, 241 N.C. 161, 84 S.E.2d 549 (1954); Wright v. Baumann, 239 Ore.
410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965); St. Regis Apartment Corp. v. Sweitzer, 32 Wis.
2d 426, 145 N.W.2d 711 (1966); see Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1965).
91. See, e.g., Richard Paul Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp.
By adopting a contractual interpretation the Code impliedly
places the landlord under a duty to relet the premises to mitigate
his damages. Specifically, Section 550892 provides that the tenant's
liability for rent cannot exceed the difference between the fair
rental value and the rent agreed to in the rental agreement plus
reasonable expenses accrued during the time necessary to re-rent
and incidental to re-renting 3  The fact that the landlord cannot
recover more than this sum regardless of whether he relets the
premises or not,9 4 makes it incumbent upon the landlord to make
every diligent effort to mitigate his losses by reletting.
B. Habitable Premises
Prior to enactment of the Code, the tenant's remedies in the
event the premises became uninhabitable were limited to: (1) a
suit for breach of covenant,95 (2) a constructive eviction action96
and (3) those remedies provided by housing codes.9 7 These reme-
dies were fraught with difficulty, and- o l+th.Ol' the either Pomnpni-
sated the tenant for damages or relieved him from liability for rent,
their ability to supply the tenant with a habitable dwelling was
questionable.
Since there was no obligation upon the landlord to supply a
habitable or fit rental unit, there was no remedy when he failed
to do so.'9 If the landlord expressly covenanted in the lease to
make repairs to the demised premises, a cause of action for damages
in breach of contract accrued to the tenant if the landlord neglected
252, 256 (D. Del. 1945); Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 37 Del. 209,
214, 181 A. 302, 305 (1935); McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord upon
Abandonment of the Premises by the Tenant, 23 MICH. L. REv. 221, 222
(1925).
92. DEL. CODE ANw. tit. 25, § 5508 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
(d) If the tenant wrongfully quits the rental unit and un-
equivocally indicates by words or deeds his intention not
to resume the tenancy, he shall be liable for the lesser
of the following for such abandonment:
(1) The entire rent due for the remainder of the term,
and reasonable renovation expenses other than for
normal wear and tear incurred in preparing the
apartment for a new tenant;
(2) All rent accrued during the period reasonably neces-
sary to rerent the premises at a fair rental, plus the
difference between such fair rental and the rent
agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a rea-
sonable commission for the renting of the premises.
This subsection shall apply notwithstanding that the
landlord did not rerent the premises.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 5508(d) (2).
95. E.g., Richard Paul Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252
(D. Del. 1945).
96. E.g., Leech v. Husbands, 34 Del. 362, 152 A. 729 (Super. 1930).
97. See notes 29, 30 supra.
98. See notes 13-17 and accompanying text supra.
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to make the promised repairs.99 If the promised repairs were mi-
nor, the tenant's measure of recovery was limited to the amount
the tenant expended in making the repairs himself.100 In any
event, the tenant was under a duty to mitigate his damages when
the landlord breached his covenant to repair and could only recover
losses which he could not avoid. 1 ' However, since the covenant
to pay rent and the covenant to repair were generally considered
independent, the tenant was required to continue paying rent in
spite of the breach.
102
Constructive eviction offered the tenant faced with untenant-
able premises a more effective remedy. When the intentional wrong-
ful acts of the landlord deprived the tenant of the beneficial enjoy-
ment of the premises such as to necessitate the tenant's abandon-
ment within a reasonable time, constructive eviction occurred.' 0 -
Constructive eviction relieved the tenant of his obligation to pay
rent. 0 4 In Leech v. Husbands,10 however, the tenant was held
to be liable for the rent when her defense of constructive eviction
failed when she was unable to prove the landlord's actions were
intentional.' 6 Failure of the tenant to successfully assert this de-
fense in Leech is illustrative of the hazards incident to this remedy.
The lessee is required to determine at his peril what circumstances
amounted to a constructive eviction and then to actually abandon
the premises, possibly at some expense. Should the tenant's deter-
mination that the landlord's acts amounted to a constructive evic-
tion be incorrect, then he was deemed to have wrongfully aban-
doned the premises and thus remained liable for the rental pay-
ments.107 Abandonment itself was often an unsatisfactory remedy
particularly for the indigent tenant in that he may not have been
able to find a more suitable dwelling, nor afford the expense inci-
dent to abandonment and acquisition of a new dwelling. 0 8  Thus,
both the tenant's right to sue for breach of covenant and construc-
99. Richard Paul Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Del. 1945).
100. Id.
101. Id.; cf. Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 37 Del. 209, 181 A.
302 (Super. 1935).
102. See notes 77, 78 and accompanying text supra.
103. E.g., Leech v. Husbands, 34 Del. 362, 152 A. 729 (Super. 1930);
Rowbotham v. Pierce, 10 Del. 135 (Super. 1876).
104. See Leech v. Husbands, 34 Del. 362, 152 A. 729 (Super. 1930).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 374, 152 A. at 735.
107. See notes 86-91 and accompanying text supra.
108. See generally Academy Squires Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477,
268 A.2d 556 (1970).
tive eviction had distinct shortcomings as effective remedial meas-
ures in achieving habitable premises.
Housing and building codes also offered the tenant potential
relief. Housing codes generally set forth minimum standards relat-
ing to space, fire safety, cleanliness, heat, plumbing and other es-
sential elements regarding the health, safety and welfare of hous-
ing occupants. Housing code enforcement, however, with its system
of relatively light criminal penalties, has traditionally been inef-
fective in achieving habitability standards for the tenant.l10
By comparison, the Code in addition to fixing the landlord with
the primary obligation to supply and maintain habitable prem-
ises," 0 provides the tenant with several remedies designed to secure
compliance. Damages, termination, rent-withholding and receiver-
ship are remedies specifically provided to the tenant by the Code.
Section 5510 provides the tenant with a general remedy for either
breach of the rental agreement or the Code by giving the tenant
the right to maintain a cause of action for damages in any court
of competent civil jurisdiction."1 Furthermore, Section 5103 states
that any written or oral agreement in conflict with the provisions
of the Code is declared unenforceable."
2
The tenant may terminate the rental agreement in the event
the landlord breaches any one of several of his obligations. If, at
the commencement of the term, the landlord has failed to substan-
tially conform to the rental agreement or materially comply with
applicable codes or statutes, Section 5304 allows the tenant to termi-
nate the rental agreement at any time during the first month of
occupancy." 3 Language in Section 5304 suggests, however, that the
109. See Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and
Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. Rv. 1254 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal
Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1965).
As to housing codes generally in Delaware, see notes 3, 30 supra. The
housing code of Wilmington, Delaware, is an exception and would appear
to be an effective source of relief for the tenant faced with uninhabitable
premises. See, e.g., WILMINGTON, DEL. CODE §§ 34-34 (rent-withholding
where the landlord is in violation of city ordinances), 34.7.1 (retaliatory
eviction), 34-8 (stiff criminal penalties).
110. See sections A and B supra.
111. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5510 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
"(a) For any violation of the rental agreement, this Code or both by either
party, the injured party shall have a right to maintain a cause of action
in any court of competent civil jurisdiction."
112. Id. § 5103 provides in part:
.... Any agreement, whether written or oral, shall be unenforce-
able insofar as the agreement or any provision thereof conflicts
with any provision of this code and is not expressly authorized
herein. Such unenforceability shall not affect other provisions of
the agreement which can be given effect without such void provi-
sion.
113. Id. § 5304 provides:
If the landlord fails to substantially conform to the rental agree-
ment, or if there is a material noncompliance with any code, stat-
ute, ordinance, or regulation governing the maintenance or opera-
tion of the premises, the tenant may, on written notice to the land-
lord, terminate the rental agreement and vacate the premises at
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tenant may waive this right and be estopped from terminating if,
in view of such conditions, he remains in possession without reli-
ance on the landlord's promise to remedy the breach, or in any
event longer than one month." 4 Section 5305 allows the tenant
to terminate at any time during the tenancy if a condition exists
which deprives the tenant of a "substantial part of the benefit and
enjoyment of the bargain." 1 5 This section is substantially a codifi-
cation of the constructive eviction doctrine, and is subject to the
same criticism.11 6
Deprivation of a "substantial part of the bargain" is basically
the same standard required at common law. 7 Thus, the tenant
invoking this section to terminate his rental agreement runs the
same risk of wrongful abandonment existing at common law."5
Assuming, however, that the tenant does rightfully abandon the
premises due to conditions caused intentionally or negligently by
the landlord, Section 5305 eases the burden and expense which was
incident to abandonment prior to the Code, 1 9 by providing the ten-
ant reasonable expenditures for substitute housing.
120
The Code also provides that the tenant may withhold rent in
the event the landlord breaches certain specific obligations. For
minor repairs and conditions short of requiring termination, the
tenant may avail himself of a repair-and-deduct remedy, i.e., the
tenant may correct the condition at his own expense and deduct
any time during the 1st month of occupancy so long as he remains
in possession in reliance on a promise, whether written or oral,
by the landlord to correct all or any part of the condition or con-
ditions which would justify termination by the tenant under this
section.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 5303 provides:
(a) If there exists any condition which deprives the tenant of
a substantial part of the benefit and enjoyment of his bargain,
the tenant may notify the landlord in writing of the situation and,
if the landlord does not remedy the situation within 15 days termi-
nate the rental agreement, after proceeding in a justice of the peace
court. Such notice need not be given when the condition renders
the rental unit uninhabitable or poses an imminent threat to the
health, welfare or safety of any occupant. The tenant may not
terminate for a condition caused by the want of due care of the
tenant, a member of his family, or other person on the premises
with his consent.
116. See notes 106-108 and accompanying text supra.
117. Id.
118. See notes 86-91 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
120. DEL. COos AN. tit. 25, § 5305(b) (Supp. 1972) provides:
(b) If the condition referred to in subsection (a) was caused will-
fully or negligently by the landlord, the tenant may recover any
damages sustained as a result of the condition, including, but not
limited to, reasonable expenditures necessary to obtain adequate
substitute housing for the term of the rental agreement,
a reasonable sum from the rent not to exceed fifty dollars.121 This
is a desirable solution to trifling defects which often arise. It pro-
vides the tenant a relatively fast, effective remedy short of more
drastic measures designed to remedy material violations or substan-
tial non-compliance to the rental agreement. Section 5307 allows
the tenant to withhold one-fourth of the rent accruing during any
period the landlord fails to provide heat, water, or hot water.
122
The tenant also may procure substitute housing in which case the
entire rent abates and the landlord is liable for reasonable cost of
substitute housing up to one-half of the abated rent.123 In the case
121. Id. § 5306 provides:
(a) If the landlord of a rental unit fails to repair, maintain, keep
in sanitary condition the leased premises, or perform in any other
manner required by statute or as agreed to in a rental agreement,
and fails to remedy such failure within 30 days after being noti-
fied in writing by the tenant to do so, the tenant may further
notify the landlord of his intention to correct the objectionable con-
dition at the landlord's expense and immediately do or have done
the necessary wok'" in a "rorkman li ke mannr, The tenant may
deduct from his rent a reasonable sum, not exceeding $50, for his
expenditures by submitting to the landlord copies of his receipts
covering at least the sum deducted.
(b) In no event may a tenant repair at the landlord's expense
when the condition complained of was caused by the want of due
care of the tenant, a member of his family, or other person on
the premises with his consent.
122. Id. § 5307 provides:
(a) If the landlord substantially fails to provide hot water, heat,
or water in violation of the rental agreement or in violation of
an applicable housing code to a tenant for 48 hours after the tenant
notifies him in writing of the failure, the tenant may:
(1) Upon written notice to the landlord, immediately termi-
nate the rental agreement; or
(2) Upon written notice to the landlord, keep 14 of the rent
accruing during any period when hot water, heat or water is not
supplied. The landlord may avoid this liability by a showing of
impossibility of performance.
(b) If the landlord fails to provide a reasonable amount of water,
hot water or adequate heat to the rental unit as specified in the
applicable city or county housing code, in violation of the rental
agreement. the tenant may:
(1) Upon written notice to the landlord, immediately termi-
nate the rental agreement; or
(2) Upon notice to the landlord, procure adequate substitute
housing for as long as heat or water or hot water is not supplied,
during which time the rent shall abate and the landlord shall be
liable for any additional expense incurred by the tenant, up to
of the amount of abated rent. This additional expense shall
not be chargeable to the landlord if he is able to show impossi-
bility of performance.
Impossibility of performance is a defense to failure to provide the re-
quired heat, hot water, etc. What exactly constitutes impossibility is not
set forth. As a rule, mere inconvenience or substantial increase in the cost
of compliance would not ordinarily relieve a promisor of his duty to per-
form his obligations. Ridley Investment Co. v. Croll, 56 Del. 208, 192 A.2d
925 (1963); Hudson v. D. & V. Mason Contractors Inc., 252 A.2d 166 (Super.
1969).
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5308 (Supp. 1972) provides:
When the rental unit or any of the property or appurtenances
necessary to the enjoyment thereof are rendered partially or wholly
unusable by fire or other casualty which occurs without fault on
the part of the tenant, a member of his family, or other person
on the premises with his consent, the tenant may:
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of fire or casualty damage rendering only a portion of the prem-
ises unusuable, the rent abates to the market value of the prem-
ises which the tenant continues to occupy.
Prior to the adoption of the Code, the landlord in Delaware had
two remedies, granted and controlled by statute, by which he could
render ineffective unilateral rent withholding actions on the part
of the tenant. The landlord had a right of distress for any rent
in arrears whereby he could seize the tenant's personal property to
satisfy the unpaid rent.124 The Code, however, has abolished the
landlord's right of distress for rent in the case of residential ten-
ancies.125 Without this abolition the landlord could easily bypass
and defeat any rent-withholding attempt by simply seizing the ten-
ant's property in satisfaction of the withheld rent.
Alternatively the landlord had a summary proceeding remedy
under a forcible entry, detainer, holding over statute.126 Having
given proper notice to quit to the tenant who has withheld his rent
the landlord could pursue summary proceedings with possession
and forcible detainer the only triable issues.127 By the very sum-
mary nature of the proceedings, and the fact that covenants were
mutually independent, the tenant was not allowed to raise the
landlord's breach of a material covenant in defense of the tenant's
rent-withholding.
28
The Code has amended the Delaware law by deleting this stat-
(1) Immediately quit the premises and notify the landlord,
in writing, of his election to quit within 1 week after vacating,
in which case the rental agreement shall terminate as of the date
of notice. If the tenant fails to notify the landlord of his election
to quit, he shall be liable for rent accruing to the date of the land-
lord's actual knowledge of the tenant's vacation or impossibility
of further occupancy; or
(2) If continued occupancy is otherwise lawful, vacate any
part of the premises rendered unusable by the fire or casualty,
in which case the tenant's liability for rent shall be no more than
the market value of that part of the premises which he continues
to use and occupy.
Recognition of a remedy for the tenant when the premises have been
totally or partially destroyed by fire or casualty is further evidence of the
Code's assault on the rent-for-possession doctrine. Previously the rule in
Delaware was that a tenant had no remedy under such circumstances since
the accidental destruction of the premises was not an eviction by the land-
lord which would relieve the tenant of his covenant to pay rent. Peterson
v. Edmundson, 5 Del. 378 (Super. 1852).
124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5501 et seq. (1953) (repealed).
125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6103 (Supp. 1972). The Code retains a
distress provision for the landlord in the case of commercial tenancies. Id.
at §§ 6301-6310.
126. DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 9651 et seq. (1953) (repealed).
127. Id. §§ 9661, 9663.
128. Id.; cf. Pefkaros v. Harman, 20 Del. Ch. 238, 174 A. 124 (Del. Ch.
1934) (equitable defenses).
ute and enacted in its place a summary proceeding for possession
which safeguards the tenant from forfeiting possession. 129  The
landlord is still authorized to bring a summary proceeding against
the tenant for failure to pay rent. 30 However, the tenant is now
clearly permitted to raise any legal or equitable defense or counter-
claim in answer to the landlord's petition for possession.1 3' By thus
allowing the tenant to raise legal defenses, the propriety of with-
holding rent in response to the landlord's breach of a material cove-
nant would be properly in issue. Should the tenant be found at
the summary proceeding to have wrongfully withheld his rent and
a judgment for possession is given to the landlord, Section 5714 pro-
vi-des for a stay of proceedings by the tenant.3 2 So long as the
tenant has acted in good faith in withholding his rent, although
wrongfully, he may stay execution of the judgment by paying all
rent due at the date of the judgment without forfeiting posses-
sion.133 Rent-withholding in some form could be a very effective
remedy by which the tenant could coerce the landlord into comply-
Ig wit h t...e terms of the rental agreement. its intended effect.
-however, would be diminished considerably if forfeiture of posses-
sion was an incident risk. The redemption provision of Section 5715
largely relieves this risk, enhancing the effectiveness of rent-with-
holding as a viable remedy.
In addition to damages, termination, and rent abatement or rent-
withholding provided in the Code, a remedy providing for tenant's
receivership has been enacted." 4  Although a powerful deterrent,
its focus differs from the other remedies available ito the tenant,
in that it seeks to correct uninhabitable or dangerous conditions
rather than coerce the landlord's compliance through threat of a
civil suit for damages or termination of the rental agreement. Any
tenant or group of tenants may petition for establishment of a re-
ceivership when for five days or more the ilandlord has violated
a duty to provide adequate heat, light, running water, electricity,
129. DEL. CODE AN. tit. 25, §§ 5701-5715 (Supp. 1972) (summary pro-
ceeding for possession).
130. Id. § 5702.
131. Id. § 5709 provides:
At the time when the petition is to be heard, the defendant or
any person in possession or claiming possession of the rental unit,
may answer .... The answer may contain any legal or equitable
defense or counterclaim.
132. Id. § 5715 provides:
When a final judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff in a pro-
ceeding brought against a tenant for failure to pay rent, and the
default arose out of a good faith dispute, the tenant may stay all
proceedings on such judgment by paying all rent due at the date
of judgment and the costs of the proceeding, or by filing with the
court his undertaking to the plaintiff, with such assurances as the
court shall require to the effect that he will pay such rent and
costs within 10 days. At the expiration of said period, the court
shall issue a warrant of execution unless satisfactory proof of pay-
ment is produced by the tenant.
133. Id.
134. Id. §§ 5901-5907.
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sewage facilities or any other conditions imminently dangerous to
life, health, or safety of the tenant.' 5" The receivership provision
is designed to place the control of seriously deteriorated buildings
in the hands of the Division of Consumer Affairs acting as re-
ceiver,' 6 who manages and rehabilitates the building until the cost
of repair is recovered through collection and use of all rents and
profits of the property. 3 7 Unlike other state receivership stat-
utes, 138 the petition for receivership is tenant initiated,1 9 rather
than municipally initiated, recognizing the compelling personal in-
terest the tenant has in regaining habitable premises. Section 5902
by requiring the joining in the petition of all parties who have an
interest in the property capable of being protected, satisfies the due
process requirement of proper notice to interest holders enabling
them to protect or defend their interests in the receivership pro-
ceeding. 40 Upon appointment, the receiver must make an inde-
pendent determination of whether correction is feasible. If an af-
firmative finding is made, it must be filed with -the recorder of
deeds and thereby constitutes a lien on the property. 141 If the re-
135. Id. § 5901 provides:
Any tenant or group of tenants may petition for the establishment
of a receivership in a justice of the peace court upon the grounds
that there has existed for 5 days or more after notice to the land-
lord:
(1) If the rental agreement or any state or local statute, code,
or regulation or ordinance, places a duty upon the landlord to so
provide, a lack of heat, or of running water, or of light, or of ade-
quate electricity, or of adequate sewage facilities;
(2) Any other conditions imminently dangerous to the life,
health, or safety of the tenant.
136. Id. § 5905.
137. Id. § 5906.
138. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Supp. 1972) (municipally
initiated); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1973) (municip-
ally initiated).
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5901 (Supp. 1972); see note 135 supra.
140. Id. § 5902 provides in part:
a. Petitioners shall join as defendants:
(2) All parties whose interest in the property is
(i) a matter of public record and (ii) capable of being
protected in this proceeding.
In Central Savings v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151
(1938), remittitur amended, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 306 U.S.
661 (1939), the court declared the New York receivership statute unconsti-
tutional in that it assessed the cost of receivership as a lien prior to existing
mortgages without affording the mortgagee an opportunity to be heard. An
amended version of the statute satisfying the notice requirements was up-
held in In re Dept. of Buildings, 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 252 N.Y.S.2d
441 (1964).
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5905 (Supp. 1972) provides:
The receiver shall be the division of consumer affairs of the State
or its successor agency.
ceiver determines that the future profits of the property will not
cover the costs of correction the receiver may be discharged and
appropriate action including vacation of the building or termina-
nation of the rental agreement may be taken.
142
The generally agreed intent of a receivership provision is to
make expensive repairs and rehabilitate rental housing in serious
disrepair where a landlord, owner, or mortgagee is unwilling or un-
able to comply.14 s To the extent that this is the intended result
of the Delaware receivership provision, its success is questionable.
One tenant in a multi-tenanted complex can apparently petition for
receivership if his dwelling alone meets the prerequisites set forth
in Section 5901.144 Although receivership would surely be success-
ful it would be legislative overkill. 1 45 To order into receivership
an entire complex to restore one unit does not appear to justify
so drastic a remedy.
On the other hand, to the extent receivership is intended to
restore dilapidated premises, the provision, presently lacks the nec-
(1) Upon its appointment, the receiver must make within 15
days an independent finding whether there is proper cause shown
for the need for rent to be paid to it and for the employment of
a private contractor to correct the condition complained of in § 5902
and found by the court to exist.
(2) If the receiver shall make such a finding, it shall file a
copy of the finding with the recorder of deeds of the county where
the property lies and it shall be a lien on that property where the
violation complained of exists.
(3) Upon completion of the aforesaid contractual work and
full payment of the contractor, the receiver shall file a certification
of such with the recorder of deeds of the appropriate county, and
this filing shall release the aforesaid lien.
(4) The receiver shall forthwith give notice to all lienholders
of record.
(5) If the receiver shall make a finding at such time or any
other time that or any reason the appointment of a receiver is not
appropriate, it shall be discharged upon notification of the court
and all interested parties, and shall make legal distribution of any
funds in its possession.
Id. § 5906 provides in part:
The receiver shall have all the powers and duties accorded a
receiver foreclosing a mortgage on real property and all other pow-
ers and duties deemed necessary by the court. Such powers and
duties shall include, but are not necessarily limited to, collecting
and using all rents and profits of the property, prior to and despite
any assignment of rent....
142. Id. § 5907 provides in part:
(c) If the court determines that future profits of the property
will not cover the costs of satisfying clauses (1) and (2) subsection
(a), the court may discharge the receiver and order such action
as would be appropriate in the situation, including but not limited
to terminating the rental agreement, and order the vacation of the
building within a specified time. In no case shall the court permit
repairs which cannot be paid out of the future profits of the prop-
erty.
143. See McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants and
Law Reform, 29 MARYLAND L. REV. 193, 199-202 (1969); Note, Enforcement
of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 828-30 (1965).
144. See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
145. Grad, New Sanctions and Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement,
3 URBAN LAWYER 577, 582-83 (1971).
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essary authority or economic ability to accomplish this intent. It
is unlikely that the rents and profits issuing from a seriously run-
down dwelling could finance its rehabilitation. The receivership
section makes no provision for state financing, nor does the receiver
have express authority to publicly finance through issuance of
bonds or receiver certificates. 146  Section 5907 provides that in no
case will repairs be permitted which cannot be paid out of future
profits of the property.1'4 Private investment is unlikely in that
the statute enacts no provision making -the receivership lien a first
lien, thus seriously jeopardizing the security of the potential
loans.'4 8 The ability to underwrite repairs of delapidated dwelling
units is a critical problem which the present statute seems unlikely
to solve. Nevertheless, the threat of receivership can be an ex-
tremely effective stimulus, inducing otherwise reluctant landlords
to make required repairs.
C. Possession
The Code's impact on the remedies available to the tenant by
which he could protect his possessory interest is difficult to meas-
ure. 149 Although the common law remedies exercisable by the ten-
ant when possession was denied or interfered with at the com-
mencement of or during the course of the tenancy have become
well settled in other jurisdictions, Delaware has few cases ad-
dressed to this point. 150  Thus a valid comparison with Code rem-
146. "Very frequently the rehabilitation requires some major 'front
money'; it requires some major input at the very beginning because you
simply can't make major repairs out of the current rents." Id. at 577, 582
(1971). The Illinois receivership statute authorizes the receiver to issue re-
ceivership certificates to finance repairs. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-
2 (Supp. 1973). In addition to the recoverable rents and profits issuing
from the property in receivership, the Division of Consumer Affairs has
been funded with only $1,000 to finance receivership actions. Interview
with Mrs. Francis West, the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs
of Delaware, in Wilmington, February 2, 1974.
147. See note 142 supra.
148. The constitutional validity of receivership statutes making the re-
ceiver's lien prior to pre-existing mortgages is in question. See Rosen, Re-
ceivership: A Useful Tool for Helping to Meet the Housing Needs of Loin
Income People, 3 HARV. CIrv. RIGHTs-Crv. Lis. L. REv. 311, 322 (1968). How-
ever both the Illinois and New York statutes have provisions making the
receivers lien prior to pre-existing mortgages. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
§ 11-31-2 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW. § 30942 (McKinney Supp.
1973-74).
149. That the lessee under a presently existing lease is owner of a pos-
sessory estate, see 1 A n rcAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, at
§ 3.38.
150. See, e.g., Colt Lanes of Dover Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 281 A.2d
596 (Del. 1971); Schwartzman v. Wilmington Stores Co., 32 Del. 7, 117 A.
739 (Super. 1922).
edies is difficult. Perhaps, the most significant contribution of the
Code with regard to these remedies is clarification.
Where the lessor or another acting under the lessor, or one as-
serting paramount title prevents the lessee from taking possession
at the commencement of the term, a cause of action for -damages
has been recognized."' In Delaware this cause of action has been
based upon breach of an implied warranty to deliver possession.152
However, Delaware courts have not addressed the issue as to
whether 'the tenant has a remedy where possession is denied by
a third person such as a holdover tenant at the commencement of
the term.'"3  Nevertheless, Section 5301 places the duty on the
landlord to supply full possession at the beginning of the term. 5 4
Where the landlord breaches this duty Section 5302 provides the
tenant several remedies.
155
Section 5302 permits rent abatement during any time the ten-
ant is unable to enter and the tenant has the option to terminate
the rental agreement. 15 6 In addition, where the tenant is denied
entry he may recover the costs of substitute housing, or deduct such
costs from his rent not exceeding the cost of one month's rent.157
Section 5302 also allows the tenant to maintain a summary proceed-
ing for possession against the holdover tenant. 15 Although there
is no case precisely on point, it appears that prior to adoption of
'the Code, the tenant had no remedy against a holdover tenant un-
der the forcible entry, detainer, holding over statute.1 59 The multi-
151. See Schwartzman v. Wilmington Stores Co., 32 Del. 7, 8, 117 A.
739, 740 (Super. 1922).
152. Id. at 10, 117 A. at 740.
153. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5302 (Supp. 1972) provides:
If the landlord fails to put the tenant into full possession of
the rental unit at the beginning of the agreed term, the rent shall
abate during any period the tenant is unable to enter, and:
(1) Upon notice to the landlord, the tenant may terminate the
rental agreement at any time he is unable to enter into possession;
and
(2) If such inability to enter is caused wrongfully by the
landlord or by anyone with the landlord's consent or license for
substantial failure to conform to existing building and housing
codes, the tenant may recover reasonable expenditures necessary
to secure adequate substitute housing for up to 1 month. In no
event shall such expenditures exceed the agreed upon rent for 1
month. Such expenditures may be recovered by appropriate action
or proceeding or by deduction from the rent upon the submission
of receipts for same.
(3) If such inability to enter results from the wrongful hold-
over of a prior tenant, the tenant may maintain a summary pro-
ceeding for possession against the wrongful occupant. The ex-
penses of such proceeding and substitute housing expenditures, as
provided in subsection (2), may be claimed from the rent in the
manner specified in subsection (2).
156. Id. § 5302(1).
157. Id. § 5302(2).
158. Id. § 5302(3).
159. Clearly the landlord had a right to proceed against the holdover
tenant under the old Code. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 9651 (c) (1953) (re-
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ple remedies in Section 5302 are comprehensive and are better
adapted to compensating the tenant denied entry at commencement
of the rental agreement than the sole pre-Code remedy of dam-
ages.
Once the tenant acquired possession, he was in a better position
to protect it. The tenant was owner of a possessory estate, even
as against the landlord. 16° Consequently the tenant could maintain
an action against a third person or the landlord in trespass' or
a summary proceeding under the forcible entry or detainer stat-
ute' 62 where the tenant's possession was interfered with or the ten-
ant was wrongfully evicted from the premises. The Code has abol-
ished the forcible entry, detainer, holding over statute, 16 8 and has
enacted in its place a summary proceeding for possession by which
the tenant may regain possession if wrongfully evicted.164 Prior
to enactment of the Code, the tenant was able to recover only pos-
session under the forcible entry, detainer statute; the tenant had
to recover damages in another action. 65 Recognizing the fact that
recoverable damages often will not justify the expense and time
of a separate action, and that the summary proceeding is designed
to provide a fast, inexpensive remedy, the Code permits the tenant
to recover both possession and damages when the summary pro-
ceeding is founded on forcible entry or forcible holding out allega-
tions.
166
At common law the tenant's possession was protected by a
pealed). However, the fact that a conventional relation of landlord and
tenant was a prerequisite to the statutory action, would appear to have pre-
cluded the new tenant from asserting the statute. Cf. Knight v. Haley, 36
Del. 366, 176 A. 461 (Super. 1935). No confusion exists under the new Code
where § 5302(3) clearly provides a summary proceeding of possession for
the tenant against the holdover tenant. See note 158 supra.
160. Lewes Sand Co. v. Graves, 40 Del. 189, 195, 8 A.2d 21, 24 (1939).
See note 149 supra.
161. Morris v. Hazel, 24 Del. 324, 77 A. 766 (Super. 1910).
162. Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711, 714 (Del. 1972) (dictum); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 9662 (1953) (repealed).
163. See note 11 supra.
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5702 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
Unless otherwise agreed in a written rental agreement, a special
proceeding may be maintained under this Chapter [§§ 5701-5715].
. . (b) The defendant has wrongfully ousted the petitioner who
is the rightful tenant of the rental unit.
Id. § 5701 provides:
A summary proceeding to recover the possession of premises may
be maintained in a justice of the peace court in the county where
the property is located.
165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 9657 (1953) (repealed); Malcolm v. Lit-
tle, 295 A.2d 711, 714 (Del. 1972) (dictum).
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5711(c) (Supp. 1972).
covenant of quiet enjoyment which was implied or expressed in
leases. 67 Entry by the landlord, one under him, or one with para-
mount title would not necessarily breach this covenant; 16 although
if it were not privileged it would constitute at least a trespass.', 9
The Code rejects this concept of an absolute possessory interest in
the tenant. Such a concept is unreasonable where the landlord is
obligated to repair and maintain a habitable dwelling.170 Section
5513 grants the landlord reasonable access to the tenant's rental
unit for inspection, repairs, and exhibition to prospective tenants
or purchasers.' 71 Reasonableness -includes consent and two days
notice, except in emergencies, as well as good faith exercise of this
right. 7 2 Although not absolute, reasonableness is the standard by
which impairment of the tenant's possessory interest may be meas-
ured. Repeated demands for unreasonable entry or entry without
the tenant's consent amount to essentially a constructive eviction




Prior to adoption of the Code, assuming the proper notice to
quit had been extended, the periodic tenant or tenant at sufferance
could be lawfully evicted for any reason or no reason.1 74 The land-
lord's motive for giving the tenant notice to quit was unimpor-
167. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
168. See 2 R. PowELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPEirY 236-37 (Rohan ed.
1973).
169. Morris v. Hazel, 24 Del. 324, 77 A. 766 (Super. 1910).
170. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra. Entry was privi-
leged at common law where the landlord reserved a right of entry to make
repairs. See, e.g., Peterson v. Edmundson, 5 Del. 378 (Super. 1852).
171. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5513 (Supp. 1972) provides:
(a) The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold his consent
to the landlord to enter into the rental unit in order to inspect the
premises, make necessary repairs, decorations, alterations, or im-
provements, supply services as agreed, or exhibit the rental unit
to prospective purchasers, mortgagees, or tenants.
(b) The landlord shall not abuse this right of access nor use
it to harass the tenant. Insofar as it is practicable to do so, the
landlord shall give the tenant at least 2 days' notice of his intent
to enter, except for emergencies and repairs requested by the ten-
ant, and shall enter only between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m., after
announcing his presence and being admitted, except in the case of
an emergency.
172. Id. § 5513(b).
173. Id. § 5514 provides in part:
(c) Repeated demands for unreasonable entry, or any entry
which is unreasonable and not consented to by the tenant, may be
treated by the tenant as grounds for termination of the rental
agreement. Any court of competent jurisdiction may issue an in-
junction against this kind of harassment on behalf of 1 or more
tenants.
(d) Every agreement or understanding between a landlord
and a tenant which purports to exempt the landlord from any lia-
bility imposed by this section, except consent to a particular entry,
shall be null and void.
174. As to requisite notice to quit under Code, see id. §§ 5407 (c), 5502.
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tant.175 Recently several states by judicial decision, 17 and several
others by statute 177 have recognized the defense of retaliatory evic-
tion. Retaliatory eviction permits the tenant to raise the landlord's
retaliatory motive as a defense to the latter's action for eviction.
It is designed to prevent landlord reprisal where the tenant has
sought enforcement of housing and building codes by complaints
to the authorities or by demanding repairs from the landlord who
is duty-bound to perform.178 Clearly the possibility of such repri-
sals would exert an inhibiting effect on a tenant seeking compliance
or enforcement of the obligations inhering to the landlord under
the Code by virtue of the landlord-tenant relationship.
The defense of retaliatory eviction has been justified on policy
grounds1'7 9 and in the case of public housing on constitutional
grounds. 80 In a leading case, Edwards v. Habib,'' the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals before resting its holding on
policy grounds, discussed the possibility that state court enforce-
ment of a landlord's action to evict a tenant in retaliation for com-
plaints to the authorities of housing code violations constituted
state action and a denial of the tenant's first amendment rights
of free speech and right to petition the government for redress of
grievances in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
Had the issue been decided on constitutional grounds it would pre-
sumably be the law nationwide. Instead, the court justified the
holding on public policy grounds noting that effective enforcement
of the health and housing codes depends upon private initiative;
175. There was one exception to this general rule where the landlord's
motive was indeed an important factor. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6705
(1953) (repealed) provided for a $500 fine or one year imprisonment if the
landlord refused to rent, cancelled the lease, or raised the rent because the
tenant had children in his family. A similar provision has been enacted
in the new Code with civil remedies where the landlord cancels a lease
for reasons of race, creed, color, sex, national origin, age, occupation, or
children in the family. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (Supp. 1972).
176. E.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1968); State v. Field, 107 N.J. Super. 107, 257 A.2d 127 (1969);
Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1970).
177. E.g., CAL. CIrv. CoDE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp.
1973).
178. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1968).
179. Id.
180. For cases decided on the grounds of public policy see note 176 su-
pra; on constitutional grounds see, e.g., McQueen v. Drucker, 438 F.2d 781
(1st Cir. 1971); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
181. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1968).
to permit retaliatory eviction would clearly frustrate the effective-
ness of the housing code.
1 8 2
Section 5516 expressly permits the assertion of retaliatory evic-
tion and retaliatory rent increases as a defense.183 Recognizing the
difficulty inherent in proving a retaliatory motive the Code pro-
vides that affirmative actions in the form of rent increases, eviction,
or decreases in required services are presumed to be retaliatory and
in violation of the Code if they take place within ninety days of
the tenant's good faith request for repairs or complaint to proper
authorities concerning housing code or ordinance violations. 84  The
retaliatory eviction provision goes to great length to limit its scope
to retaliatory motives only and thereby protect the landlord's in-
terests. Several specific instances where the landlord would clearly
have a good faith reason to raise rent or evict the tenant are set
forth and the landlord may act accordingly notwithstanding the
presumption raised. 8 5
The Code also provides for a cause of action to the tenant where
the landlord has acted with a retaliatory motive.8 6 Where the
landlord has successfully recovered possession from the tenant in
violation of the section, the tenant is entitled to recover three
months rent or treble damages and the cost of the suit. 8 7
Not only recognizing a new right in the tenant not to be evicted
for a retaliatory motive, the Code also provides that a tenant may
be evicted only by a valid court order. 88  Originally in Delaware
182. Id. at 701.
183. DEL. CODE ANq. tit. 25, § 5516 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
(a) Notwithstanding that the tenant has no written rental
agreement or that it has expired, so long as the tenant continues
to tender the usual rent to the landlord or proceeds to tender re-
ceipts for rent lawfully withheld under Chapter 59 of this Code,
no action or proceeding to recover possession of the rental unit may
be maintained against the tenant, and the landlord shall not (1)
otherwise cause the tenant to quit the rental unit involuntarily, (2)
demand an increase in rent from the tenant, or (3) decrease the
services to which the tenant has been entitled after:
(i) The tenant has complained in good faith of conditions in
or affecting his rental unit which constitute a violation of a build-
ing, housing, sanitary, or other code or ordinance to an authority
charged with the enforcement of such code or ordinance; or
(ii) Such authority has filed a notice or complaint of such
violation; or
(iii) The tenant has in good faith requested repairs as pro-
vided herein.
(b) Within 90 days after any complaints as enumerated in
subparagraphs (i), (ii) or (iii) above, if the landlord institutes any
of the affirmative actions set forth in subsection (a) above, such
conduct shall be presumed to have been in violation of this section.
184. Id. § 5516(b).
185. Id. § 5516(c), (e).
186. Id. § 5516(d).
187. Id. § 5517 provides:
If removed from the premises or excluded therefrom by the land-
lord or his agent, except under color of a valid court order authoriz-
ing such removal or exclusion, the tenant may recover possession
or terminate the rental agreement, and in either case, recover treble
damages sustained by him, and the costs of the suit.
188. See note 187 supra.
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the landlord could lawfully expel a holdover tenant without judi-
cial process.18 9 However, in Malcolm v. Little90 a holdover tenant
brought an action against the landlord who had locked him out of
his apartment. The Delaware Supreme Court interpreted the en-
actment of the forcible entry, detainer, and holding over statute
to be in derogation of the common law rule and therefore, to be
the exclusive lawful means of regaining possession from a holdover
tenant.' The tenant's action was in tort and the right violated
was the right to noninterference with peaceable possession except
by lawful means. 1'9 2 Section 5517 is consistent with the result in
Malcolm. If the tenant is removed or excluded from the premises
except under color of a valid court order, Section 5517 permits the
tenant to recover possession or to terminate, and in either case to
recover treble damages.' 93
CONCLUSION
The Code has effected several fundamental changes in the land-
lord-tenant relationship; tenants rights have been strengthened as
a result. The most significant changes have focused on the habit-
ability aspects of the tenant's premises. First, in recognition of the
fact that the landlord was under no obligation to supply a habitable
dwelling, the Code sets forth several express obligations running
from the landlord -to the tenant. The Code makes the landlord
duty-bound to supply not only possession, but also a habitable
dwelling during the course of the tenancy. 9 4 Arising by virtue
of the special landlord-tenant relationship existing between the par-
ties, such duties are imposed by law and are generally not subject
to waiver or modification in the rental agreement.1'9
Secondly, the Code rejects the antiquated doctrine that the
tenant pays rent for only possession and the covenant of quiet en-
joyment. That in today's society the tenant expects to receive in
consideration for his rent not only physical possession but also heat,
plumbing and other essential services seems all too obvious. The
Code by providing that covenants in the lease be interpreted as
mutually dependent lays to rest the doctrine of "rent-for-posses-
189. State v. Stansborough, 1 Del. Cas. 129 (1797).
190. 295 A.2d 711 (Del. 1972).
191. Id. at 713.
192. The tenant recovered $3,000 in compensatory damages and $6,000
in punitive damages later reduced by remittitur to $3,000 punitive damages.
Id. at 714.
193. See note 187 supra.
194. See notes 22-25, 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
195. See notes 111, 112 and accompanying text supra.
sion" and its corollary of mutually independent covenants.19 By
thus rejecting the conveyance concept of a lease in favor of a con-
tractual interpretation the Code expands the remedies available to
the tenant when the landlord does in fact breach the rental agree-
ment. Should the landlord default in his primary obligations, a
number of remedies are made available to the tenant: damages,
summary proceeding for possession, termination of the rental agree-
ment, rent abatement, repair-and-deduct and receivership. The
pre-Code remedies of damages and constructive eviction were often
inadequate in either failing to provide habitable premises or requir-
ing abandonment at some cost and risk to the tenant. The Code,
in addition to modifying these common ,law remedies, offers several
alternatives designed to achieve habitable premises through actual
repairs rather than by mere tenant threats of damage suits or lease
termination. 1
97
Finally, the tenant's ability to seek enforcement of his newly
created rights set forth in the Code is preserved and strengthened
by adoption of the retaliatory eviction provision. Tne absence of
such a provision could in the final analysis render nugatory, partic-
ularly for the short term tenant, those obligations and remedies
designed to achieve habitable premises for the tenant.
198
The Code is comprehensive and the changes wrought in Dela-
ware landlord-tenant law are great, exerting a profound, beneficial
effect on tenant's rights. Whether the mere adoption of such a
Code, however, will act as an immediate incentive to the landlord
to provide better quality rental housing, is uncertain. Section 6504
of the Code requires the landlord to give the tenant along with
the lease a summary of the Code prepared by the Attorney Gen-
eral. 1 9 The extent to which this provision is effective in educating
the tenant in his newly created rights and remedies should meas-
ure to a large degree the landlord's response to the new obligations
imposed upon him by the Code. Regardless of any time lag be-
tween its enactment and full compliance therewith, the Code is the
essential first step toward providing the tenant with enforceable
rights with which he can secure habitable premises.
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